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TAKING "JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS"
SERIOUSLY: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
JEFFREY M. GABAt
In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but
organized brigandage? - St. Augustine1
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part,
that private property shall not "be taken for public use without just
compensation." This is the so-called "Takings Clause," and, since the
Supreme Court's 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,2 it has
served as a limitation on government regulatory actions that go "too
far" in restricting the use of property. Defining "how far is too far" is
the central objective of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, but the
Court's analysis is recognized by all to be (as it is most politely
phrased) "a muddle."
3
Perhaps the most important reason for this "muddle" is the fail-
ure of the Court to articulate a coherent conceptual basis for the Tak-
ings Clause. A variety of themes have been advanced to describe the
basis of the Takings Clause. For some, the Takings Clause represents
a critical component of personal liberty that bars the government from
interfering with some almost absolute right to property. For others, it
is merely a codification on the government's authority to appropriate
title through eminent domain.
One important theme arises from the otherwise unremarkable
case of Armstrong v. United States.4 In that opinion, Justice Black
advanced the dogmatic conclusion that the Takings Clause "was de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
t Professor, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University; M.P.H.
Harvard 1989; J.D. Columbia 1976; B.A. University of California Santa Barbara 1972.
Of Counsel, Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP., Dallas, Texas. Email: jgaba@smu.edu. A
version of this Article was presented as part of the Public Scholar program of the Cary
M. Maguire Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility at Southern Methodist
University.
1. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 88 (1958).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Mud-
dle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
4. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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public as a whole."5 This conception of the Takings Clause has been
cited in numerous cases since Armstrong. In Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 6 for example, Justice
Stevens devoted much of his opinion to an analysis of whether princi-
ples of "justice and fairness" justified temporary restrictions on con-
struction under the Takings Clause.
This conception of "justice and fairness" embodied in Armstrong
raises one of the central concerns of moral philosophy - an issue that
has captured the attention of philosophers from Aristotle to Star
Trek's Mr. Spock - when do the needs of the many outweigh the needs
of the few? 7 In Aristotelian terms, this is the issue of "distributive
justice" or the ethical analysis of the distribution of benefits and bur-
dens in society.8
An issue of philosophy to academics, this issue of distributive jus-
tice has now been converted by the Court into an issue of constitu-
tional law. Although the Supreme Court, since Armstrong, has
described the Takings Clause as reflecting a concern for distributive
justice, it has never explained the historical or legal basis for this
view. Perhaps worse, the Court has not directly addressed the conse-
quences of incorporating principles of distributive justice into the
Fifth Amendment.
The purpose of this Article is to consider some of the implications
of incorporating a principle of distributive justice into the Fifth
Amendment. 9 It begins with an analysis of the origins of Fifth
5. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Black's opinion refers to
"fairness and justice," but the Supreme Court routinely cites the proposition as "justice
and fairness." See, eg., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). Who am I to differ; I go with "justice and fairness."
The Court has also, in a number of cases since Armstrong, cited similar dogmatic
language in the 1893 case, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
325 (1893), in which the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment "prevents the public
from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of govern-
ment. . . ." The principle is, however, generally traced to Armstrong. See William
Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensa-
tion Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997).
6. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
7. See generally STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982).
8. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of
distributive justice. Fairness, at least since Aristotle, has been seen as involving a num-
ber of distinct applications. Thus, distributive justice can be seen as analytically dis-
tinct from retributive and compensatory justice.
9. The objectives of this Article are thus modest. It is not my intent to derive a
"takings test" based on principles of distributive justice or to evaluate the outcome of
any dispute in those terms. Rather, it is to raise some of the serious implications that
follow from incorporating a principle of distributive justice into the Takings Clause.
There is a growing literature on the role of "justice and fairness" in takings analy-
sis. Perhaps the most influential article in the field is Professor Michelman's classic,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Other scholars have taken up the challenge
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Amendment regulatory takings analysis and the basis (or lack of one)
for the inclusion of a principle of distributive justice. Next, it briefly
discusses the concept of distributive justice reflected in the Armstrong
principles of "justice and fairness." Finally, it addresses four key im-
plications of incorporating a conception of distributive justice into the
Takings Clause. First, a focus on distributive justice is a move away
from an assessment of government regulation of private property
based on individual "rights." Second, the traditional takings factors
previously advanced by the Court can be seen in a new way if ana-
lyzed in light of principles of distributive justice. Third, a focus on
distributive justice may open new sources for evaluating takings. Fi-
nally, a concern for distributive justice raises troubling questions
about the legitimacy of decisions grounded, not in history or neutral
principles, but in an unelected judiciary's views of principles of justice
and fairness. A grounding of the Takings Clause in these ethical prin-
ciples may suggest an extremely limited role for the Court in finding a
regulatory taking.
I. SEARCHING FOR THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE: HISTORY, POWER, AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
Although many see the Takings Clause as a central statement of
fundamental liberty, the Takings Clause has two dirty little secrets.
First, there is virtually no historical evidence on the intent that lay
behind the adoption of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment.
Second, it was not until 1922 that the Supreme Court, in what was an
extraordinary act of judicial activism, claimed that the Takings
Clause acted to limit government regulatory authority.
A. THE HISTORIcAL BASIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Although there were ideas current in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries (and contemporaneous land use regulation by States)
that might inform an interpretation of the Takings Clause, there is
almost no direct evidence of the intent of those who actually proposed
and adopted the Takings Clause.' 0 The Bill of Rights was adopted by
of interpreting the requirements of the Takings Clause in light of the Supreme Court's
reference to "justice and fairness." See, eg., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive
Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999); Treanor, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 1151; Leigh
Raymond, Comment, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and Justice, 23
ECOLOGY L.Q. 577 (1996).
10. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original
Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); John F. Hart, Colonial
Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REV.
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Congress in 1789 and subsequently ratified by the States." Many of
the provisions in the Bill of Rights arose from petitions submitted by
the States, but this was not the case with the Takings Clause. The
Takings Clause stands alone as the only part of the Bill of Rights that
was not requested by a single state.
12
Madison's first draft of what became the Takings Clause stated
that a person could not "be obligated to relinquish his property, where
it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation."'
3
This draft was later revised, without explanation, into its current ver-
sion by a Committee of the House of Representatives. In the reported
debate on the proposed Bill of Rights in the House and Senate, there is
no reference to the Takings Clause. 14 Certainly the Takings Clause
did not reflect an eighteenth-century view that the government could
not regulate land without providing compensation; scholars have
pointed to numerous practices of the States at the time of adoption of
the Bill of Rights that involved substantial government regulation of
land use without compensation.
15
In short, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the people
who drafted or adopted the Takings Clause cast the provision as a
central protection of government regulation of private property.
16
1252 (1996); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985).
Perhaps the best exchange on the role of history in evaluating takings claims arose
between Justices Scalia and Blackmun in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992). In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia finds that the Takings Clause
is grounded in some, presumably Lockean, "historical compact." Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1028. Justice Blackmun in dissent describes the lack of historical basis for the major-
ity's view. Id. at 1056 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Scalia, in a footnote rebuttal, dis-
putes the relevance of the historical record. Id. at 1028 n.15. Blackmun, getting in the
last word, writes: "I cannot imagine where the Court finds its 'historical compact,' if not
in history." Id. at 1060 n.26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11. Actually, Congress adopted twelve amendments as part of the Bill of Rights;
only ten were subsequently ratified by States.
12. See Edward Dumbauld, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 161-63
(1957).
13. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS
361 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); Treanor, 94 YALE L.J. at 708-12 (discussing the history of
the adoption of the Takings Clause and Madison's views).
14. See Cogan, supra note 13, at 375.
15. See Hart, 109 HARv. L. REV. at 1289-91.
16. This has not prevented some from finding a specific intent underlying the Tak-
ings Clause in certain ideas current at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights. Thus,
Richard Epstein would define the purposes of the Takings Clause in his particular read-
ing of John Locke. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). In Epstein's view, only "reciprocity of advantage" would
justify a government regulation that seemed to diminish the value of property. See id.
at 195-99. In other words, Epstein would interpret the Takings Clause to prohibit redis-
tributive goals of government. Douglas Kmiec would find a definite meaning in the
Takings Clause arising from Blackstone's views on the absolute nature of property. In
Dean Kmiec's views, government regulation that diminishes value is limited to those
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Even more certainly, there is no evidence that the Takings Clause
"was designed" to incorporate principles of distributive justice. This,
of course, does not mean that the Takings Clause cannot fill that role;
it does, however, raise real questions as to whether the "original in-
tent" of its drafters supports a specific view of the meaning or purpose
of the Takings Clause.
B. HOLMES, PENNSYLVANI4 COAL, AND A JUDICIL POWER GRAB
The Takings Clause was the subject of relatively little attention
until the pivotal Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon 17 in 1922. Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge by coal
companies to a Pennsylvania statute that required coal companies en-
gaged in subsurface mining to leave pillars of coal in place to support
the surface from subsidence. 18 Justice Holmes, in a short but seminal
opinion, held that the statute violated the Takings Clause. 19 The Su-
preme Court, for the first time, announced the crucial proposition that
a regulation may violate the Takings Clause even if it does not effect a
physical appropriation of property. 20 As Holmes stated, "The general
rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
2 1
To be sure, there is an obvious logic to the proposition. Being pre-
cluded from making use of your property may have the same effect as
having title actually taken by the government. But besides the "obvi-
ous," on what did Holmes rely for this groundbreaking proposition?
2 2
The answer is nothing. Holmes cites to no support for this position
other than the self-evident logic. Whatever its "obvious" logic and ap-
peal, the expansion of the Takings Clause to cover regulatory acts by
the government was a tremendous shift from the Court's past treat-
ment of the Takings Clause.23 It was, and is, an extraordinary asser-
tion of the judiciary's authority to invalidate otherwise validly adopted
government regulation based on a court's view of whether the regula-
tion goes "too far." Few opinions of the Supreme Court have resulted
expectations of property ownership, defined by common law views of nuisance, which
underlay some eighteenth-century commentator's views of property ownership. See
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak
Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630 (1988).
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922).
19. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
20. Id. at 417.
21. Id. at 415.
22. That is, in fact, the basis for Holmes' opinion; he states that "obviously" govern-
ment regulatory must have some limits. Id. at 413.
23. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992), Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged that prior to Pennsylvania Coal the Takings Clause had been
limited in application to situations of direct appropriation of private property.
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in so great a usurpation of authority by the judiciary with so little
support.
Holmes sketched out a variety of factors that he viewed as rele-
vant to determining "how far" is "too far" for purposes of determining
whether a regulation constitutes a taking of private property. I will
discuss some of those below, but the crucial first step was the equation
of regulation with a taking. Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has
identified a limited class of "per se" takings, but the major theme of
Supreme Court takings analysis has been an "ad hoc" balancing of fac-
tors whose basis have largely been unexamined and unexplained.
24
C. ARMSTRONG, FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
In 1960, the Supreme Court announced what was a new and dis-
tinctive statement of the purpose of the Takings Clause. In Armstrong
v. United States,25 Justice Black made the following assertion about
"the" purpose of the Takings Clause. According to Black:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.
2 6
There is much to be said for this view of the Takings Clause, but what
cannot be said is that it is founded in history or precedent. What
source does Justice Black rely on for his statement about the purpose
of the Takings Clause? Black cites the same source as Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal - nothing.2 7 Although this view of the Fifth
Amendment has been repeated many times by the Court,28 it is gener-
ally supported by a citation to Black's statement in Armstrong. Noth-
ing in the history of the adoption of the Takings Clause, of course,
directly supports this position, and the Supreme Court has done noth-
ing since Armstrong to justify its legitimacy.
24. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (discussing the
Court's existing approach to evaluating regulatory takings). See infra notes 54-67 for a
discussion of the factors generally identified by the Court as relevant in an "ad hoc"
balance.
25. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
26. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
27. See generally Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (lacking a citation
of any sort about the purpose of the Takings Clause). Justice Black does provide a "cf."
to Thibodo v. United States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951). This Ninth Circuit case, of no
particular ethical pedigree, involved a rather technical discussion of whether a bond
holder could recover principal and interest when the government condemned land se-
curing the bond. Thibodo, 187 F.2d at 250-51.
28. The Supreme Court, by my Westlaw search, has cited this statement in Arm-
strong sixteen times since 1960.
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Content to cite Black's statement of the Takings Clause, the Su-
preme Court has never seriously explored the implications of viewing
the Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice. Indeed, the Court
seems to have shied away from any serious analysis. In Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,29 Justice O'Connor, noted that
[t]he concepts of "fairness and justice" that underlie the Tak-
ings Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate. Ac-
cordingly, we have eschewed "any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the gov-
ernment, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons. The outcome instead "depends largely 'upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case.'"
30
In essence, in assessing "justice and fairness," the Court has resorted
to the same ad hoc balancing that has been the Court's traditional
approach to the Takings Clause since Pennsylvania Coal.
This was certainly the approach the Court adopted in Tahoe-Si-
erra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 3 1 Jus-
tice Stevens' majority opinion purported to address directly whether
principles of "justice and fairness" would themselves support a cate-
gorical rule that development moratoria constituted a Fifth Amend-
ment Taking.32 In rejecting such a categorical rule, Justice Stevens
again essentially equated the application of principles of "justice and
fairness" to the case-by-case balancing approach conventionally em-
ployed by the Court in takings cases. 33 Although Justice Stevens as-
sessed traditional factors in his analysis, there was nothing which
applied those factors in any way that uniquely evaluated the distribu-
tional justice issues raised by the Armstrong principles.
34
If, however, the Court is going to ground its takings analysis in
conceptions of "justice and fairness," it is time to confront the implica-
tions of this approach.
29. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
30. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (citations omitted).
31. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
32. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336
(2002).
33. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 336.
34. The statement, and its logic, was applied with perhaps the greatest force by
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978). In that case, the majority upheld a New York City historic preser-
vation law that limited plans for a major alteration of Penn Station. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 438 U.S. at 138. Rehnquist noted that the owners of Penn Central were being sin-
gled out because the building was built too well, and Rehnquist, relying in part on
Black's statement in Armstrong, would have held the requirement a taking since it un-
fairly singled out the property owner to bear the cost of a public benefit. Id. at 141
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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II. PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The concept of distributive justice has, at its core, a concern with
the fair distribution of resources among members of society. It in-
volves basic questions relating to the justifications for resolving com-
peting claims to finite resources. What is a just distribution and what
are the qualities that entitle an individual to claim a just share? It
also involves, in the words of the Armstrong principle, a concern for
deciding when costs can be imposed on a few and when "in justice and
fairness" such costs should be borne by the public as a whole.
Evaluation of the concept of distributive justice has been a basic
part of Western ethical thinking for over three thousand years. Aris-
totle's writings in the Nichomacean Ethics are still central to discus-
sions in this area. Enlightenment philosophers, especially David
Hume, have described fundamental principles that govern an evalua-
tion of distributive justice. Over the last fifty years, much of the aca-
demic literature has focused on economic and game theoretic
approaches to evaluation of distributive justice. John Rawls' work on
evaluation of the fairness of institutions and the role of impartiality
has become a basic part of any discussion of distributive justice. The
literature on distributive justice is enormous and can be extraordina-
rily technical.
As with most areas of ethics, the literature produces many ques-
tions but few answers. General consensus on a number of fundamen-
tal principles does exist, however, and these principles guide the
search for theories of distributive justice.
A. PREMISES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
One concept stands at the center of an evaluation of distributive
justice; it is the concept of equality. At least since Aristotle, the basic
tenet of distributive justice is the requirement of equality of treatment
of individuals. To paraphrase Aristotle, distributive justice involves
treating "like things, in a like manner."35 According to Amartya Sen,
all theories of distributive justice involve a requirement of equality;
theories vary only with respect to what quality is to be equalized
among people - the "equalisandum."36 This requirement for equality
of treatment is generally known as the "formal principle of justice."
Despite this focus on equality, distributive justice does not require
that people be treated equally, only that differences in treatment are
35. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 129 (Barker trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1961); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 118 (Martin Oswald trans., Macmillan
1986).
36. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
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justifiable on grounds relevant to the distinction.37 As Aristotle
noted,
persons who are equal should be assigned to them equal
things. But here arises a question which must not be over-
looked. Equals and unequals - yes; but equals and unequals
in what? This is a question which raises difficulties, and in-
volves us in philosophical speculation on politics.
38
Difficult political questions indeed.
In contrast to the "formal principle of justice" that requires the
equal treatment of equals, the "material principles of justice" define
the criteria that justify differing treatment of individuals. Under va-
rying theories, distributive justice is satisfied if differences are justi-
fied under appropriate material principles of justice. Thus, as
discussed below, if "merit" is viewed as the appropriate material prin-
ciple of justice, persons who work harder or produce more may be enti-
tled to a greater share of a finite resource. If "need" is the appropriate
material principle, a view of "from each according to his ability, to
each according to his need" may be justified. Identification of appro-
priate "material principles" is perhaps the central debate in analysis
of distributive justice.
In most ethical theories, virtues and a Kantian set of morally
compelled behaviors exist independent of the society in which they are
evaluated. Thus, benevolence towards others may be a virtue that is
independent of the social institutions of a culture. In contrast, many
philosophers view distributive justice as constituting a virtue that can
only be assessed or identified in a social context. As such, one cannot
determine what is "just" outside the context of the institutions of soci-
ety, and one cannot say what an individual is "due" under principles of
distributive justice without regard to such institutions.39 Thus, the
obligations of distributive justice are not defined ex-ante, but arise
from the institutions that establish relationships and claims within a
37. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines "distributive justice" as
principles specifying the just distribution of benefits and burdens: the outcome
in which everyone receives their due. A common basis is that persons should
be treated equally unless reasons for inequality exist: after that the problems
include the kind of reasons that justify departing from equality, the role of the
state in rectifying inequality, the link between a distributive system and the
maximization of well-being.
SIMON BLACKBURN, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 203 (1996).
38. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 35, at 129.
39. Indeed, David Hume described justice as an "artificial virtue" that is estab-
lished and defined by the rules of society. Hume states, "Tis very preposterous, there-
fore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property without fully comprehending the
nature of justice, and showing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of men. The
origin of justice explains that of property." See DAVID HUME, A Treatise of Human Na-
ture 315 (Norton and Notron eds. 2000).
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society. Putting it simply, there may not be one morally correct an-
swer to the obligations of distributive justice that can be identified
through traditional ethical appeal to deontological obligations or
moral intuition.
B. THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
With these principles as a predicate, a variety of theories of dis-
tributive justice have been proposed to "solve" the question of how fi-
nite resources are to be "justly" allocated within society. These
theories have been organized in a variety of ways that highlight cer-
tain common qualities of the theories. No particular classification per-
fectly captures the relationships among the differing theories, but
they do help to focus on important elements. The following taxonomy
focuses on several factors and highlights specific approaches associ-
ated with these theories.
1. Maximization of Social Utility
Perhaps the most coherent and well explored theory of distribu-
tive justice is one that holds resources should be divided to secure the
greatest overall utility to society as a whole, in other words, utilitari-
anism. The philosopher most associated with a strict utilitarian the-
ory of justice is, of course, Jeremy Bentham. There are recurring
issues with application of a Benthamite utilitarian approach. What is
the nature of the "utility" that is being maximized? How do you assess
the individual utilities that are to be maximized? Yet, at its core, util-
itarianism is based on a simple concept - there is a moral goal of maxi-
mizing the overall extent of satisfaction in society.
40
It would seem curious to claim utilitarianism as a credible theory
of distributive justice. One of the fundamental criticisms of utilitari-
anism is that the principle is blind to concerns for the distribution of
utility within society.4 1 Certainly, the theory allows the unequal im-
position of costs on some so long as the overall utility of society is fur-
thered. Nonetheless, utilitarianism in some form has been a central
40. Although in some respects it seems to glorify a conception of efficiency as the
goal of justice and fairness, utilitarianism clearly is premised on two compelling ethical
principles. First, each individual speaks with an equal voice in calculating overall effi-
ciency. Although different people have differing assessments of utility, each person's
assessment is entitled to the same weight. In some sense, utilitarianism contains ele-
ments of autonomy, or respect for individual capacities, and impartiality in the sense of
equal moral standing for each individual. Second, utilitarianism is fundamentally
grounded a virtue of benevolence. The furthering of the well-being of humans is itself a
moral goal that forms the core of judgments about moral actions.
41. See, e.g., WILLIAM K FRANKENA, ETHICs 48-52 (2d ed. 1973); Steven Kelman,
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, Jan-Feb. 1981, at 33.
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component of "welfare-based" analysis of distributive concerns.
4 2
Something like utilitarianism has been analyzed in more traditional
ethical modes. John Harsanyi, for example, has approached the issue
of distributive justice in a way that eliminates the bias of unearned
differences in individual capacity.4 3 In other words, distributive jus-
tice is to be assessed not from the perspective of the claims of actual
individuals, but rather from an "impartial" perspective that identifies
justifiable moral claims independent of the identity of an existing
claimant. This approach involves application of a form of a Rawlsian
"veil of ignorance." Harsanyi's conclusion leads to a rule that maxi-
mizes the average utility of all members of society. In other words, if
you do not know which role you will be assigned in society, the best
rule of allocation for you to choose is one that maximizes the average
utility of everyone. This is a conclusion that is essentially equivalent
to utilitarianism.
At one time, the Supreme Court flirted with the idea of some con-
cept of efficiency as a measure of the Takings Clause. The Court sug-
gested that a regulation could not be a taking if it "substantially
advanced legitimate state interests." In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.,44 however, the Court recently rejected this formulation. The
Court concluded that a takings assessment based on efficiency and ra-
tionality was inappropriate since a test that does not consider how a
"burden is allocated cannot tell us when justice might require that the
burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of
compensation."
45
The Court's conclusion is certainly appropriate and consistent
with some criticisms of the distributive implications of utilitarianism.
The Court's conclusion is not, however, compelled. This is not to sug-
gest that utilitarianism is the correct or even a compelling principle of
distributive justice. It is to suggest that a utilitarian approach cannot
be dismissed from the class of possible, legitimate ethical principles of
distributive justice.
2. Maximization of Individual Utilities
Other approaches to distributive judgment involve an assessment
of the individual utilities of competing claimants. In contrast to a
classic utilitarian approach that uses individual utility solely to calcu-
late the sum of total social utility, these approaches try to define rules
42. See, e.g., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Distributive Justice (Mar. 5,
2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/.
43. See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Moral-
ity? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 594, 594-606 (1975).
44. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
45. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
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that fairly satisfy the individual objectives of the claimants. In effect,
they attempt to define "fair" solutions to the problem of division of a
finite resource that can be said to fairly satisfy the individual utility
objectives of the competing actors. 4 6 These approaches generally lead
into the complex and highly mathematical area of game theory and
bargaining solutions. The work of John Nash, for example, has led to
a series of Nash Bargaining Solutions to fair division problems. These
types of analyses fall in the domain of mathematicians and econo-
mists, and pity the poor lawyers and judges who might need to under-
stand these concepts.
Reference to game theory, in fact, leads to the fundamental ques-
tion - what does this have to do with an ethical issue of distributive
justice? There is a well recognized disconnect between the language
and methodology of game theory approaches and a more traditional
philosophical approach to the ethics of distributive justice. 4 7 Nonethe-
less, these approaches do have standing as moral theories. As noted
above, an axiom of distributive justice, from Aristotle to Sen, is the
goal of providing "equality" of treatment. In an important sense, these
game theory approaches define the object of equality as individual
utility. This is a conceptually strong basis for a fair or justice alloca-
tion; it is simply not the only basis as will be discussed below.
Even if viewed as a form of ethical analysis of distributive justice,
these game theory approaches have deep analytical problems that
may prevent their application as a solution to takings issues. First,
these approaches, relying as they do on a principle of equality of indi-
vidual utility, ignore other possible principles that might be defensible
in assessment of a fair distribution. As will be discussed below, princi-
46. See generally BRIAN M. BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE (1989). The original in-
sights for this area developed from the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern. Apply-
ing game theory principles to a fair division problem between two persons, the goal was
to use information about the preferences of the two parties to determine some "best"
allocation of a finite resource. Since these approaches rely on an assumption that a fair
allocation will be in the best interest of both parties, any fair allocation must provide
that no party is worse off after the allocation than the party was before. In such a case,
both parties have an incentive to vary the initial allocation: one or both will be better off
and neither will be worse off.
Given information about the parties' initial position or "non-agreement point" and
their relative preferences for the outcome, certain game theoretic approaches can pro-
vide a series of possible outcomes that defined a range of allocations that would improve
the position of one or both parties. Each of these different outcomes represented an
allocation in which it was not possible to improve the utility of one party without de-
creasing the utility of the other - the pareto frontier. They could not, however, produce
a single or "unique" solution to a two player fair division problem. A series of ap-
proaches stemming from the work of John Nash have provided solutions that purport to
define a unique solution to a two player bargaining problem. These all, in one way or
another, can be characterized as among a class of "Nash Bargaining Solutions."
47. See JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1-3 (1996).
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ples of "blameworthiness" or "need" are traditionally advocated as ap-
propriate criteria. Viewed in this way, Nash Bargaining Solutions
and indeed, most game theory approaches, do not solve the problem of
fair division; they simply define an approach to calculating the solu-
tion to one, among many possible, approaches to the definition of dis-
tributive justice.48 These approaches are not wrong; they simply have
no more moral standing than other approaches in consideration of fair
division.
More significantly, a fundamental problem arises from a basic
premise of these approaches. All require definition of a "non-agree-
ment" point that specifies the amount of the resource that the parties
will receive in the absence of further allocation. 49 Identification of the
non-agreement point is critical to define the range of possible out-
comes. No solution which makes a claimant worse off is permissible
since that party has no incentive to move from the status quo.
The very purpose of the takings analysis, however, is to define the
circumstances in which a party who currently owns property should
be compensated when there is some reallocation of value from the
owner to society as a whole. If the non-agreement point is defined as
absolute ownership, then there may be no bargaining solution that
does not require compensation since no rational landowner makes
that bargain. If, however, existing property rights are not absolute,
but are limited by legitimate government regulation, then some range
of uncompensated "takings" are possible as a "fair" distribution. In-
deed, the definition of the non-agreement point is, in many ways, the
basic question of distributive justice in the context of a takings analy-
sis. Since game theoretic approaches require the definition of a "non-
agreement" point (and predict the implications that arise from a given
non-agreement point), but they beg the fundamental questions raised
by the takings issue. Some other principle or principles of distributive
justice must be invoked to resolve this question.
3. Justifiable Inequality
Although distributive justice is premised on a goal of equality of
treatment, in many ways the goal is not to define the elements of
equality; rather the goal is to define the elements that justify unequal
48. It is possible to argue that, although additional factors may be appropriate in
assessing the fairness and justice of division, any allocation that satisfies, for example,
some form of Nash Bargaining Solution also satisfies minimum conceptions of fairness.
In other words, any solution that provides an equivalent division of individual utility
presumptively satisfies a sense of fair or just allocation unless "trumped" by some other
principle of distributive justice. A solution which does not constitute a Nash Bargaining
Solution might be presumptively unfair unless justified by some other principle.
49. See generally BARRY, supra note 46.
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treatment among individuals. In other words, distributive justice re-
quires equal treatment of all individuals unless there is a "material
principle" that justifies different and unequal treatment. A search for
justifiable principles of inequality leads to a vast set of proposals in
the history of moral philosophy. In these approaches, the key compo-
nent of distributive justice is the moral justification that is made for
any specific material principle of justice. Obviously, there is no con-
sensus on any one approach to define universally acceptable
principles.
One historically significant material principle of justice is an allo-
cation based on "need"; the factor that justifies different treatment of
people is their varying levels of need. With need as the principle of
justice, a redistribution of wealth from "haves" to "have nots" is just.
Although having a familiar Marxist flavor, some view of fairness and
justice as not only authorizing but also compelling special treatment
for the needy has a strong ethical pedigree.
Other views of justice justify the different treatment of individu-
als based on "merit" or "desert." In other words, individuals through
their effort or other morally commendable behavior are entitled to a
greater share of resources. In contrast to a theory of merit that justi-
fies a reward for morally praiseworthy or productive effort, it is a rela-
tively uncontroversial proposition that a principle of distributive
justice allows for the different treatment of individuals who engage in
morally blameworthy conduct. Thus, few theories of distributive jus-
tice would preclude a reallocation of an existing resource from an indi-
vidual that acquired the resource through theft or by violation of some
other socially proscribed conduct such as cheating or even monopolis-
tic behavior. The goal of a theory of distributive justice that relies on
a criterion of blameworthiness is to define that class of "bad" behavior
that justifies redistribution. As discussed below, this issue is implicit
in much of the Court's search for takings criteria.
4. Impartiality and Process
Other approaches to distributive justice invoke a conception of im-
partiality in assessing the justice of the distribution of resources in
society. The goal of this approach is to define the elements of social
institutions that result in a fair distribution of resources in a manner
that is neutral or impartial with respect to any individual's class or
status role in society. The focus of this approach is not on the outcome
of the distribution, but on the process and rules that decide the
allocation. 50
50. Robert Nozick, for example, would distinguish between patterned and unpat-
terned conceptions of distributive justice. Patterned conceptions judge the fairness of
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Several premises underlie much of this thinking. First, distribu-
tive justice is implemented through social institutions, and it is the
fairness of institutions, not the fairness of individual determinations
or allocations, that should be the focus of justice concerns. Second, in-
dividuals have no moral claim to their individual capacity or status in
society (i.e., intelligence, strength, inherited status), and fairness
therefore requires a distributive scheme that does not depend on allo-
cation based on capacity. This does not mean that just institutions
cannot make distinctions based on these capacities, but it does mean
that the justness of the institutions themselves must be assessed in a
manner that is impartial and not biased to further the ends of any
particular class or status. Third, to the extent distributive justice is
premised on self-interest, just social institutions are to be assessed
based on the extent to which they satisfy the self-interest of an impar-
tial participant.
Evaluating distributive justice through a lens of impartiality has
both strength and weaknesses in the takings context. A focus on so-
cial institutions rather than specific outcomes clearly has advantages.
If social institutions are designed in a way that is perceived to result
in distributive justice, the role of the courts would focus on ensuring
the proper operation of the institution rather than an assessment of
the outcome. Further, it has an appealing approach to the problem of
equality by seeking to define institutions that are equally fair and
equally acceptable to all elements of society since, in this approach,
institutions must be assessed based on the possibility that any indi-
vidual might occupy any position in society.
Distributive justice as impartiality has, however, obvious flaws as
a tool for practical application. Unlike claims of game theory, it de-
fines an approach rather than a unique solution to distributive justice
questions. Further, to the extent that elements such as a Rawlsian
"difference principle" rely not on impartial self-interest, but on a
moral concern that justifies redistributive policies, this approach re-
quires application of a material principle other than impartiality.
an allocation by whether there is, at a given point in time, a "just" distribution of re-
sources in society. Unpatterned conceptions, in contrast, focus not on the outcome, but
on the rules of allocation. In Nozick's view, a given distribution of resources is not sub-
ject to criticism on distributive justice grounds if the initial allocation was fair and the
rules of subsequent transfer among individuals are fair. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 150-60 (1975).
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AS A
PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
If the Takings Clause is seen as embodying a principle of distribu-
tive justice, then it is time for the Supreme Court seriously to consider
the implications that follow from this view. This is not an idle aca-
demic exercise; much is at stake in terms of the limits on government
authority and the perception of legitimacy of the Court's approach.
One thing certainly does not follow from this view. Application of
the Takings Clause does not become simpler or clearer; no bright line
test emerges to replace the current muddle. As Justice O'Connor has
noted, principles of "justice and fairness" are "less than fully determi-
nate."5 1 The Supreme Court's goal, if distributive justice is to be
taken seriously, should be to articulate the factors that justify the im-
position of regulatory costs on a limited group of people. 5 2
A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
One of the great challenges to conceptions of distributive justice is
to reconcile concerns for justice with claims of individual rights. If
distributive justice focuses on the "fair" and "equal" resolution of com-
peting claims by individuals, a focus on individual rights has, as a cen-
tral quality, a claim that such rights cannot be sacrificed to further a
general social value. In Ronald Dworkin's phrase, rights are "trump"
that cannot be required to yield to a general utilitarian concern with
social utility.53 If, as discussed below, utilitarianism represents one
valid theory of distributive justice, concerns for individual rights and
distributive justice may, in certain circumstances, be in conflict.
Although not all theories of distributive justice create an inevita-
ble conflict, the language of distributive justice and individual rights
is clearly different. Rights language asks what fundamental claims
can an individual make on society. In contrast, distributive justice
51. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
52. Obviously, this is a search for principles grounded in "justice and fairness."
Citing language from Armstrong, Dean Kmiec states that "[t]he straightforward pur-
pose of the Takings Clause is to avoid the disproportionate placement of public burdens
upon a single property owner." Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces
into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1997). This statement, how-
ever, seriously mischaracterizes the Armstrong principle of distributive justice under
which an action would be a taking if it "unfairly" or "unjustly" imposed a burden. "Dis-
proportionate" burdens fail a test of distributive justice only if you view "proportion" as
the appropriate principle of justice. If "disproportionate" merely means that a taking
results when the distribution fails a test of"fairness" under some other material princi-
ple, then it is simply a tautology.
53. Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Wal-
dron ed., 1984); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press
2005).
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asks how access to limited resources is to be allocated within society.
Justice and fairness, in distributive justice terms, implies the possibil-
ity of trade-offs and compromise to satisfy the legitimate claims of
competing individuals. Analyses based on individual rights have a
quality of absolutism that is contrary to an approach of compromise
and allocation. Rights have a Kantian or deontological quality while
distributive justice, in Hume's term, is an artificial virtue tied to par-
ticular social institutions.
Thus, a shift in Fifth Amendment takings analysis from a focus
on property rights to a concern for the "justice and fairness" of the
allocation of costs of social programs is a major, if subtle, shift in a
view of the purpose of the Takings Clause
B. REASSESSING TAKINGS FACTORS IN LIGHT OF DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
Although the Court has generally failed expressly to evaluate its
balancing factors in terms of distributive justice, most factors appear
to have a rough relevance to a consideration of fairness. Much like
Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain, the Supreme Court may have been
speaking "fairness and justice" for forty years without knowing it. A
sharper focus on the implication of these factors to issues of distribu-
tive justice will, however, likely alter the way they are evaluated and
suggest others that might be relevant.
1. Reciprocity of Advantage
At least since Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "reciprocity of advantage" is relevant in determining
whether a regulation is a taking. Although a regulation may burden
me to benefit another, that same regulation may benefit another to
benefit me. The issue of reciprocity, in part, addresses the question of
loss. It asks whether the benefits of the regulation to the landowner
offset the burdens; a regulation will not be a taking if the landowner
receives sufficient benefit to require no additional compensation. In
other words: no harm, no foul.
This concept of "reciprocity of advantage" is clearly relevant to
virtually any assessment of distributive justice. Without loss, it is
hard to say that a person has been unfairly singled out to bear the cost
of regulation. 54 In many ways, it is an imperfect application of a prin-
54. Although phrased in terms of "reciprocity of advantage" the principle surely
cannot focus simply on the equality of benefits among affected landowners. Is distribu-
tive justice satisfied if my neighbor and I receive reciprocal benefits from a regulation
although the regulation imposes a greater burden on me? The factor of reciprocity
should, for purposes of distributive justice, focus not only on the magnitude and reci-
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ciple of equivalent individual utility, and satisfaction of a condition of
reciprocity of benefits and burdens may define one class of regulations
that do not require compensation. Regulations that do not provide
reciprocity of advantage may still be justifiably imposed without com-
pensation if they satisfy some other principle of distributive justice.
Reciprocity of benefits and burdens is thus a sufficient, but not neces-
sary, condition for determining regulations that, in "justice and fair-
ness," do not require compensation.
2. Magnitude of Loss
One of the more puzzling factors used by the Court in assessing
takings is the magnitude of the loss suffered by a landowner. The
clear implication of the Court's pragmatic balancing approach is that
some substantial level of loss must be accepted but that too great a
loss results in a taking. Thus, at least since the crucial zoning case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,55 losses of property value of up
to seventy-five percent may not constitute a taking.5 6 In contrast, the
Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council57 held that a 100%
loss of value is a "per se" taking.5 s Forgetting, for the moment, the
difficulty of drawing the line where a loss of value becomes "too great,"
the Court has never clearly articulated why some substantial loss does
not require compensation while somewhat more loss does.
The answer may lie in terms of distributive justice. If we view
most regulations as resulting in a roughly fair distribution of benefits
and burdens over time (a form of "temporal" reciprocity of advantage),
significant short-term burdens (although ultimately compensated
through general social regulation) may still be viewed as unfair.
Thus, in fairness terms, the issue of the magnitude of loss is relevant
to determining whether a landowner has suffered a burden that is not
only disproportionate over the short-term but also of such a magni-
tude that it is unfair to require a landowner to bear it at any time.
But again the issue is "how much is too much"? Perhaps, the an-
swer lies in a utilitarian assessment of efficiency as reflected in insur-
ance theory. Insurance involves the sharing of risk with others to
minimize loss, but, in most economic views, insurance is appropriately
employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and unpredict-
able events. Insurance theory indicates that we should not buy insur-
ance to cover relatively small losses that arise from the regular and
procity of benefit but also on whether affected parties are all treated with some rough
equality in terms of both benefits and burdens.
55. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56. Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 365 (1926).
57. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-20 (1992).
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expected events; it is economically more rational to bear such losses
ourselves. I am reasonably sure that there are nice formulas devel-
oped by economists that indicate the economically rational situations
in which risks should be spread through insurance.
Perhaps the Takings Clause can be seen, in part, as a form of so-
cial insurance that requires compensation for catastrophic loss
through regulation. Through taxes we pay the premiums for protec-
tion against such catastrophic loss, but we bear the costs of routine
regulatory loss ourselves. In this view "temporal reciprocity" justifies
the fairness of routine regulation and the "social insurance" aspect
mitigates the unfairness of a loss of beyond a certain magnitude.
3. Blameworthy Conduct
A factor that has dogged the Supreme Court's takings analysis
has been the relevance of "blameworthiness" in assessing a taking. Is
a regulation less likely to be a taking if it prohibits blameworthy con-
duct of the affected landowner? Is a regulation more likely to be a
taking if it regulates otherwise benign conduct? It would be hard to
dispute that the moral blameworthiness of the burdened landowner
would be relevant in assessing the distributive justice of a regulation.
No one complains that landowners have lost value because they are
prohibited from selling heroin or dumping nuclear waste on their
property.
The problem arises in how to characterize "blameworthiness."
One strange line of thinking suggested by the Court can be seen as the
"two sided coin" approach. In this view, forcing a landowner to confer
a public benefit is equivalent (the flip side of the coin) to preventing
the harm of losing the benefit. This was, in part, the logic employed
by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.59 In Penn Central, the Court upheld a New York landmark
preservation ordinance that limited the development of an historic
building.60 Altering Penn Station may be an aesthetic disaster, but it
is harder to make the case that the owner of a building considered
important to the public is morally blameworthy for developing the
building in the same manner available to the owners of less important
buildings. Nonetheless, part of the Supreme Court's analysis was pre-
mised on the view that altering the building was, in some sense,
equivalent to harm-inflicting acts that are the more traditional target
of government regulation.
In contrast, others have suggested a view premised on an analysis
of common law rules of nuisance. Although the Supreme Court has
59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
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never gone this far, some have advocated a view that nuisance, the
historic common law approach to regulating "unreasonable" uses of
land, serves to define the limits of uncompensated government tak-
ings.6 1 In this view, the government would be free to regulate nui-
sance-like behavior, but the Takings Clause would require
compensation when the government regulated conduct that did not
constitute a common law nuisance. In part, this view is premised on
the view that one can have no legitimate expectation of a property
interest in conducting nuisance-like activity. It also, however, seems
to reflect a view that nuisance-like activity is also "blameworthy" and
thus not entitled to compensation. Conceptions of nuisance that focus
on efficiency concerns in reconciling two legitimate but competing
uses, however, suggest that an evaluation of moral blameworthiness
is not equivalent to an assessment of nuisance.
Thus, the issue of "blameworthiness" cannot be resolved either by
sophistry or common law rules of land use. The issue, as focused by a
concern for distributive justice, may more properly address whether
the conduct of the affected landowner is such that it is appropriate to
impose the onus of uncompensated regulation to address the conse-
quence of the behavior.
62
4. Investment-Backed Expectations
The Supreme Court has regularly stated that it is relevant for
purposes of a takings analysis if a regulation affects reasonable "in-
vestment-backed expectations." This concept, first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
61. See, eg., Kmiec, 88 COLUM. L. REV. at 1630. There are hints of this approach in
Lucas. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-32. In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a regulation
that prohibits a common law nuisance can never be a taking (in part, based on the logic
that you can never be deprived of a property right that you never had). Id. Although
this seems clearly correct, it says nothing about whether a regulation could be a taking
if it regulated other than nuisance-like behavior. In Lucas, the Court accepted as fact
that the land in question had lost all of its value as a result of a government regulation.
Id. at 1027. The Supreme Court adopted a per se takings rule that a 100% loss of value
would be a taking unless the government was regulating a traditional common law nui-
sance. The Court did not resolve the issue of when a taking would be found when there
is less than a 100% loss in value.
62. See generally, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Even a focus on the moral "blameworthiness" of conduct raises very difficult questions.
Is destruction of critical habitat of an endangered species sufficiently blameworthy to
justify regulation without compensation? Destruction of this remaining habitat may
only be significant because ninety percent of the habitat has previously been destroyed
by unregulated prior development. In other words, how is one to claim that uncompen-
sated regulation is justified based on the blameworthiness of conduct when the "blame-
worthy" consequences arise only because the landowner is among the last to engage in
the conduct.
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City,6 3 has been the subject of much debate and more confusion.6 4 Al-
though recognition of a role for "investment-backed expectations," ap-
parently finds it origin in Professor Michelman's classic, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law,6 5 the Supreme Court has never been clear about
the relationship of "investment-backed expectations" to questions of
"justice and fairness."
Surely, however, a landowner's "expectations" are relevant to an
assessment of the fairness of imposing regulatory burdens. A focus on
"expectations" can reflect a concern with the fairness of imposing costs
on a landowner who has reasonably relied on a state of law. Cer-
tainly, the extent of reliance, perhaps reflected in the concept of "in-
vestment-backed" expectations, is relevant to the fairness of the
allocation of costs.
The challenge is to turn the concept of "investment-backed expec-
tations" to a focus on criteria of distributive justice. What are the spe-
cial qualities of expectation that warrant special treatment of some
landowners as opposed to others? Michelman provided some answers,
but there are certainly others. Again, a concern for distributive justice
does not resolve these questions but may help sharpen the focus and
rationale on the role of expectations in takings analysis.
5. Selection Process
If distributive justice is concerned with unfairly "singling out" a
person to bear the costs of regulation, one would assume that the ac-
tual process of selection would be relevant in assessing fairness. Deci-
sion-making processes that may repeatedly single out certain groups
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
64. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 105. There is general consensus that
the Supreme Court has thoroughly muddied any coherent basis for a concern for "in-
vestment-backed expectations." See, eg., R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Ex-
pectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-
Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001);
Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW.
215 (1995).
65. Michelman, 80 HARv. L. REV. at 1165. In his article, Professor Michelman
identified the importance of the role of "justified, investment-backed expectations" in
evaluating takings claims. See id. at 1213. In part, Michelman focused on a utilitarian
component that requires protection of expectations to promote efficient use of property.
As Michelman notes, in a utilitarian analysis "[s]ecurity of expectation is cherished, not
for its own sake, but only as a shield for morale." Id. Michelman also expressed the
view that "the purpose of compensation is to prevent a special kind of suffering on the
part of people who have grounds for feeling themselves the victims of unprincipled ex-
ploitation." Id. at 1230. This suggests some deontological obligation to avoid harming
others as a basis for the Taking Clause. Yet utilitarian or deontological concerns for the
protection of expectations do not capture the full set of issues of distributive justice that
warrant protection of certain classes of reasonable expectations.
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to bear regulatory costs would raise distributive justice, and therefore
takings, concerns.
The Supreme Court, however, has only obliquely indicated that a
takings analysis involves a focus on the decision-making process.
There is an odd line of takings cases in which courts have not found a
taking when the regulation was a result of some natural calamity.
Thus, in the important but odd case of Miller v. Schoene,66 the Su-
preme Court found no taking when the owner of cedar trees was re-
quired, in order to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, to
destroy his trees to protect economically more valueable apple trees.
67
Conceding the legitimacy of the need to protect the more valuable ap-
ple trees, this hardly provides an explanation of why fairness does not
require compensation of the owner of the cedar trees. Certainly, the
Court failed to provide such an explanation.
Perhaps the answer lies in the issue of process. The owner of the
cedar trees was singled out, not by the potentially manipulated politi-
cal process, but rather by the vagaries of disease. In other words, God,
not people, selected the victim. If you have questions about fairness,
take it up with clergy, not the courts.
Whether this in fact underlies the courts' treatment of calamity
cases, the issue of selection process seems relevant to an assessment
of fairness. In line with the calamity cases, a regulation should be less
likely to be seen as a taking when the burden imposed by a regulation
is assigned based on some objective criteria that do not lend them-
selves to political manipulation. In this view, Endangered Species Act
or wetlands regulations would not raise heightened takings concerns
if restrictions were imposed based on the qualities of the land (and its
critters) rather than the qualities of the landowner.
C. LOOKING TO SOURCES BEYOND THE LAw
The Supreme Court's search for factors relevant to a takings anal-
ysis has been long on imagination but short on references. The aca-
demic literature is rich with political and economic analyses of the
takings issue, but this has generally been of little utility to the Court.
It is problematic to rely on political theory and economics when it is
unclear how those relate to the core objectives of the Takings Clause.
A focus on the Takings Clause as a principle of distributivejustice
has the potential to open a line of takings analysis based on the litera-
ture of moral philosophy. There is a substantial body of literature
evaluating the concept and application of distributive justice that
66. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
67. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1928).
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could be relevant to a court's analysis. It might be odd to cite Aristotle
in support of a takings argument before the Supreme Court, but the
inherently extra-legal judgments inherent in distributive justice may
point to reliance on extra-legal sources.
The application of philosophical analysis to law is not, of course,
unknown. John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin, among
many others, bring substantial insights from philosophy into the legal
discourse on the Takings Clause. Perhaps the most influential (or at
least the most cited) law review article on takings, Professor
Michelman's Property, Utility and Fairness, provides an interesting
analysis of fairness in the takings context through an application of
Rawls.6 8 Thus, a focus on the Takings Clause in terms of distributive
justice could open the door to a whole body of literature and analysis
to inform the takings debate. Thus, it may be appropriate to cite Aris-
totle as well as Euclid.
6 9
D. LEGITIMACY, JUDGES, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Although a focus on distributive justice may open the door to a
judicial evaluation of philosophical concepts, the question remains as
to whether we want judges to walk through that door. How is one to
assess the legitimacy of a position that requires judges to apply their
conceptions of "fairness and justice" in establishing limits on govern-
ment power?
This issue raises a number of questions (and one significant con-
clusion). The initial question is whether a proposed theory of the Tak-
ings Clause that requires courts to make such indeterminate and
extra-legal judgments fails on that ground alone? In other words, is it
impermissible to interpret the Takings Clause in distributive justice
terms because it requires judges to become involved in philosophical
issues of fairness?
There are several not so simple responses to this concern. First, it
is the Supreme Court itself that has articulated this rationale for the
Takings Clause. It is also a principle that has been cited by a wide
spectrum of views on the Court - from Blackmun to Rehnquist and
Scalia. You can blame them if you do not like this claim of judicial
authority. Second, alternative interpretations of the Takings Clause
involve the courts in applying their value judgments; an express reli-
ance of distributive justice makes this process more open. Finally,
68. Michelman, 80 HARv. L. REV. at 1219. Michelman's article relies on an early
version of Rawls' work and hence fails to consider certain implications of changes, par-
ticularly the "difference principle," that Rawls made to his theories in a later version of
A Theory of Justice.
69. Referring, of course, to Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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other aspects of constitutional interpretation, particularly the devel-
opment of "substantive due process," involve the courts in extra-tex-
tual and arguably extra-judicial limits on government power. Thus,
the intrusion of judges' values into constitutional interpretation has
some pedigree.
A second question is whether, as an institutional matter, it is
proper to rely on the philosophical views of a narrow, unelected, and
unaccountable group of judges. Since this approach to the Takings
Clause largely eliminates any "neutral" anchoring of takings analysis
in text or history, a concern that the biases and prejudices of judges
will shape takings law is quite real. 70 Certainly, concerns for modes of
constitutional interpretation that rely on the underlying values of
unelected judges are widely expressed by scholars and judges. 7 1 A fo-
cus on distributional justice has the virtue, at least, of being more,
rather than less, explicit about this aspect of the law.
A third question is whether society would accept takings decisions
premised on judicial views of distributive justice?7 2 Will individuals
be content to accept restrictions on the use of their property based on
assurances by a court that it is fair? As noted, Rawls' theory of justice
involves an identification of those social practices and institutions
that disinterested observers, operating behind a "veil of ignorance" as
to their place in society, would agree are fair. This suggests that an
individual could be expected to accept a decision based on the follow-
ing logic: "You would think it was fair if you were as smart as I am."
This is perhaps not the most compelling argument for social accept-
ance of imposition of a regulatory burden.
These concerns with the institutional legitimacy of judicially de-
rived judgments of distributive justice thus suggest perhaps the most
significant consequence of a principle of takings grounded in "justice
and fairness." Since courts have limited institutional competence and
70. Addressing this issue, Professor Michelman notes that "[however difficult the
fairness standard may be to formulate and apply, there is no obvious reason for suppos-
ing that political actors should be able to understand it better or handle it more deftly
than judges can." See Michelman, 80 HARv. L. REV. at 1248.
71. Concerns range the spectrum from "legal realists," such as Karl Llewellyn, to
Scalia's criticism of the Court's analysis in abortion decisions. See, eg., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
some, however, moral readings are at the heart of a process of interpretation of funda-
mental liberties in the Constitution. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996).
It is certainly not my intent here to delve in the murky waters of constitutional
interpretation and post-modern critiques of the nature of the judicial process. Suffice it
to say that an express reliance on principles of distributive justice clearly highlights the
amorphous and untethered basis of judicial review of takings.
72. The question of the legitimacy of courts in a democratic society raises its own
set of concerns. See, eg., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Philip Bob-
bitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991).
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few neutral criteria to apply in making distributive justice decisions,
judges should be extremely chary of substituting their views of fair-
ness for legislative judgments. In other words, the Takings Clause
should have limited force except in the most extreme cases. This is
not an abandonment of the principle of distributive justice, but it is a
recognition that such judgments are better left to elected and socially
responsive legislatures rather than courts.
This seems to be exactly the position taken by the Supreme Court
in the area of substantive due process and the regulation of land use.
Although the Court has recognized the possibility of invalidating leg-
islative acts on due process grounds, it has largely chosen not to exer-
cise such power except in defined areas of fundamental rights.
73
In this view, the conjoined twins of "due process" and "takings,"
both contained within the same sentence of the Fifth Amendment,
would serve as conceptual limits to government power, but a limit that
would be sparingly invoked by the courts. Although specialized cases
of takings (particularly actions that approach exercise of eminent do-
main power) might be subject to a more searching takings analysis,
courts would largely defer to legislative judgments of fairness in most
cases of regulatory restrictions.
In fact, this sounds like what the Court is doing.74 What is differ-
ent is that a focus on distributive justice provides a clearer basis than
the Court's current reliance on an unexplained and unexplainable bal-
ancing act. Further, it does suggest a line of analysis for courts brave
enough to take on concepts of distributive justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For good or ill, the concept of the Takings Clause as a principle of
distributive justice arises from the Supreme Court's own statements.
The Supreme Court has made and repeated the claim that the Tak-
ings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."7 5 At a minimum, the Court should
be aware of the consequences that follow from such a view.
Viewed through the lens of distributive justice, takings analysis
gains a sharper focus on those factors that are relevant to assessing
73. Thus concepts of substantive due process, hinted at by the Supreme Court in
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365, and Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928),
have largely disappeared from federal constitutional analysis in regulation of land use.
Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
74. The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005),
specifically articulated a general rule of deference to legislative judgments of "public
purpose" in the Fifth Amendment context of eminent domain.
75. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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the "fairness" of imposing costs on the few to benefit the many. The
logical implication of this view is a takings test which is no more clear
or certain in application than the current muddle. Additionally it ex-
pressly requires the courts to engage in social and philosophical judg-
ments that many would say are beyond their competence (used both in
the sense of judges' institutional role and their intelligence). Perhaps
most significantly, it suggests a limited role for the judiciary in polic-
ing the social judgments of legislators and could confine the Takings
Clause, along with the Due Process Clause, to a limited role.
